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The objective of patent examination is to separate the wheat from the cha. Good
applications { those satisfying the patentability criteria, particularly novelty and non-
obviousness { should be accepted, while bad applications should be rejected. How should
incentives for examiners be designed to further this objective? This paper develops a the-
oretical model of patent examination to address the question. It argues that examination
can be described as a moral-hazard problem followed by an adverse-selection problem:
the examiner must be given incentives to exert eort (looking for evidence to reject), but
also to truthfully reveal the evidence he nds (or lack thereof). The model can explain
the puzzling compensation scheme in use at the U.S. patent oce, where examiners are
essentially rewarded for granting patents, as well as variation in compensation schemes
across patent oces. It also has implications for the retention of examiners and for ad-
ministrative patent review.
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11 Introduction
Patent examiners at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oce (USPTO) receive a bonus that
depends on the number of applications processed. But because a rejection is more time-
consuming than a grant, the bonus introduces a bias towards granting patents (Jae and
Lerner, 2004; Merges, 1999). Such a compensation scheme is puzzling since it does not seem
to give examiners good incentives to exert eort. While rejecting an application requires
the examiner to come up with evidence that the claimed invention already exists or would
have been obvious to someone skilled in the art, granting a patent is easy: the examiner can
simply report not having found such evidence. If anything, shouldn't we expect examiners to
be rewarded for rejecting applications?
The objective of patent examination is to separate the wheat from the cha. Good appli-
cations { those satisfying the patentability criteria, particularly novelty and non-obviousness
{ should be accepted, while bad applications should be rejected. How must incentives for
examiners be designed to further this objective? In this paper I develop a theoretical model
of patent examination to address the question. I argue that examination can be described as a
moral-hazard problem followed by an adverse-selection problem: the examiner must be given
incentives to exert eort (looking for evidence to reject), but must also be given incentives to
truthfully reveal the evidence he nds (or lack thereof). I show that the model can explain
the puzzling compensation scheme in use at the USPTO, as well as variation in compensation
schemes across patent oces. It also has important policy implications.
In a nutshell, the argument is the following. Suppose the examiner wants to avoid mistakes
and believes that a large proportion of applications is bad. If, moreover, he doesn't make much
eort in searching for evidence, he will have little condence that an application is good when
the search turns up nothing. Inducing him to truthfully reveal the absence of evidence then
requires rewarding him for grants. The possibility of this type of bad equilibrium provides a
rationale for the compensation scheme observed at the USPTO.
The argument rests on two premises. First, the signal that an application is bad must be
soft information, i.e., unveriable by the principal and third parties. This makes sense because
of the technical complexity of patent applications, the vagueness of patentability criteria, and
because there is little information on the quality of an examiner's decisions in the short run.
While more information becomes available in the long run (e.g., through court decisions on
patent validity), this information is dicult to include in a contract. Second, examiners must
have a desire to avoid mistakes that is unrelated to short-term monetary compensation. Such
a desire might stem from long-term implicit incentives within the organization (promotion
etc.), but also from recognition by peers or a concern for social welfare. With a slight abuse
2of language, I will refer to the desire to avoid mistakes as intrinsic motivation.
The argument also raises the question of when a bad equilibrium, characterized by low
eort, many bad applications, and { as a result { low-quality patents, will arise. I show that
it is precisely when intrinsic motivation is low that such an equilibrium is likely to occur. Low
intrinsic motivation leads to lower eort and a larger proportion of bad applications. Under
some conditions, ensuring truthfulness then makes it necessary to reward the examiner for
grants. As intrinsic motivation increases, however, this may no longer be the case.
I go on to argue that intrinsic motivation is likely to be related to how long the exam-
iner expects to stay at the patent oce and to how timely information about the quality of
his decisions becomes available. Under this interpretation, the predictions of the model are
consistent with casual empirical evidence. A comparison of the USPTO with the European
Patent Oce (EPO) shows important dierences in examiner turnover, the availability of in-
formation on decision quality, short-term compensation, and applicant behavior. The average
U.S. examiner stays for only three years while in Europe it is basically a lifetime job (van
Pottelsberghe and Fran cois, forthcoming). The EPO's opposition system makes information
about decision quality available in a more timely manner than court trials, which are the
main source of information in the U.S. These facts suggest that intrinsic motivation should
be lower in the U.S. than in Europe. Thus, the model would predict that patents issued by
the USPTO are of lower quality than EPO patents, and that U.S. examiners are more likely
to be rewarded for granting through short-term compensation. At the same time, it makes
no prediction on grant rates.
The observation that, unlike their U.S. counterparts, examiners at the EPO receive a xed
wage is in line with these predictions (Friebel et al., 2006). And while patent quality is hard
to measure, the perception in the patent community is that the problem is indeed more acute
in the U.S.1 In addition, recent research shows little dierence in grant rates between the two
oces (Friebel et al., 2006; Lemley and Sampat, 2008).
Why should we care about patent examination? To begin with, patents create (temporary)
monopolies. Granting patents for non-inventions causes deadweight loss and litigation without
providing any osetting benet to society. This would be a minor problem if the courts only
enforced good patents. Courts, however, sometimes enforce bad patents, as the near shutdown
of BlackBerry in 2006 illustrates.2 Moreover, many patent disputes never reach the courts.
1 See, e.g., Jae and Lerner (2004). The fact that the topic has been much more intensely debated in the
U.S. can be seen as a rough indicator that the quality of patents issued by the USPTO is lower.
2 The maker of BlackBerry mobile devices, Research In Motion (RIM), was sued by patent-holding company
NTP, and settled for a reported $612.5 million because the court threatened to issue an injunction unless the
parties reached a settlement. The injunction would have shut down BlackBerry. Apparently, the judge was
unprepared to wait for the nal result of the re-examination of NTP's patents by the USPTO even though
the oce had indicated that it was likely to revoke all of the patents NTP had asserted against RIM. See
3Challenging a bad patent is a public good and may therefore be under-provided (Chiou, 2006;
Farrell and Shapiro, 2008). What is particularly troublesome is that, as Chiou (2008) shows,
disputes over weak patents are particularly likely to be settled out of court. And when patent
disputes do reach the courts, they entail substantial legal costs. Ford et al. (2007) estimate
the total cost of bad patents to the U.S. economy at an annual $25.5 billion.3
In the model presented in section 2, the government delegates patent examination to an
examiner motivated by both extrinsic rewards (i.e., monetary transfers) and intrinsic rewards
(dened as a concern about making correct decisions). The examiner must expend eort to
obtain a signal about an applicant. If the applicant's claimed invention is not truly new,
the examiner can come up with a signal (\prior art") demonstrating the lack of novelty; I
assume that the signal is soft information. The examiner takes the proportion of good and
bad applications as given. Applicants, however, respond to how rigorous they anticipate
examination to be. I assume that the applicants' best-response function is such that the
proportion of good applications increases with the expected examination eort.
The government chooses an application fee for rms and an incentive scheme for the ex-
aminer. In section 3, I start by studying the government's choice of incentives, taking the
application fee as given. Soft information severely limits the use of explicit monetary in-
centives, so that the examiner's intrinsic motivation becomes the crucial determinant of the
equilibrium outcome. I establish two main results. First, both the equilibrium proportion of
good applications and the equilibrium eort are increasing in the examiner's intrinsic moti-
vation. Second, for low levels of intrinsic motivation, the optimal incentive scheme rewards
the examiner for granting patents. This is true assuming the proportion of bad applications
is suciently large when applicants expect zero eort. There is a complementarity between
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards: the more intrinsically motivated the examiner is, the more
eectively can monetary incentives be used. It eventually becomes possible to reward him for
rejecting, which feeds back positively into eort provision.
In section 4, I endogenize the applicants' best-response function. I assume that potential
applicants dier in their ability to produce valuable inventions (their creativity) and choose
whether to do genuine research or to le applications on existing technologies, hoping to
escape detection by the examiner. The protability of the two activities depends on the
examiner's examination eort. More rigorous examination makes it less likely for impostors
to obtain patents, and therefore increases the attractiveness of true research. This setup
Time Magazine, \Patently Absurd", April 2, 2006, available online at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,1179349,00.html.
3 Of this sum, they attribute $4.5 billion to litigation costs, while the remainder corresponds to the
disincentive to future innovators that patents create. While methodologically controversial, Ford et al.'s (2007)
calculations indicate that the costs of bad patents are likely to be signicant.
4leads to self-selection of applicants. Under a single-crossing condition, high-creativity rms
do genuine research, while low-creativity rms submit bad applications or stay idle.
The endogenization of applicant behavior allows me to study the eect of changes in the
application fee and to make normative statements about the optimal patent policy. I show
that if the government can directly control the level of examination eort, the optimal policy
leads to full deterrence of bad applications. Eort is chosen to balance the benets of research
with the costs of patent examination, while the application fee is used to achieve deterrence.
When patent examination is delegated to an examiner, however, there is a tradeo between
deterrence and innovation: a lower application fee leads to more bad applications but at the
same time induces the examiner to screen more rigorously, which, in turn, leads to more
innovation.
In section 5, I summarize the results of the model and discuss how it relates empirically
observed dierences between patent oces to compensation schemes and applicant behavior.
I also comment briey on policy implications.
A number of recent papers investigate patent examination. Langinier and Marcoul (2003)
and Caillaud and Duch^ ene (2005) start from the idea that patent examination resembles an
inspection game and as such is plagued by commitment problems. Langinier and Marcoul
(2003) study inventors' incentives to search for and disclose relevant prior art to the patent
oce. They nd that, when the patent oce cannot commit to a level of screening, there
exists no equilibrium where applicants who have obtained a positive signal separate from
applicants with a negative signal in terms of the amount of prior art they submit. The
focus in Caillaud and Duch^ ene (2005) is on the \overload problem" facing the patent oce:
when ooded with large numbers of applications, the average quality of examination declines,
leading to a vicious circle by encouraging even more invalid applications. Again, there cannot
be a separating equilibrium, i.e., one where only valid applicants le for a patent. R egibeau
and Rockett (2007) examine the optimal duration of patent examination as a function of the
importance of an innovation. They nd that, controlling for the position in the innovation
cycle, more important innovations should be examined faster, a prediction which is born out
by evidence from a sample of U.S. patents.
All of these papers consider a benevolent patent oce maximizing social welfare. There-
fore, they are unable to make predictions about examiner compensation. With the exception
of Caillaud and Duch^ ene (2005), they also treat the proportion of good and bad applications
as exogenous, so they cannot explain dierences in applicants' behavior. By contrast, I con-
sider a utility-maximizing examiner (albeit motivated to some extent by a desire to avoid
mistakes) and allow the proportion of good applications to depend on the examiner's eort.
The paper is also related to the auditing literature, and particularly Iossa and Legros
5(2004), who study auditing with soft information. They show that a necessary condition for
the auditor to exert any eort is that he be given a stake in the audited project. Similarly, I
show that positive eort will only occur if the examiner is intrinsically motivated { that is, if
he has a \stake" in the social consequences of his decision.
2 A simple model of patent examination
Consider the following setup. There are three types of players: a benevolent planner (the
government or Congress), a patent examiner, and potential applicants (rms). The planner,
whose objective is to maximize social welfare, delegates patent examination to the examiner.
Applications led by rms can be good (G), i.e. true inventions, or bad (B), i.e. non-inventions
which already exist or would have been obvious to someone skilled in the art.
Examiner
The examiner does not observe the type of an application but believes that a proportion
p is good and a proportion 1   p is bad. He conducts a prior-art search that allows him to
receive a signal  about an application. The distribution of the signal depends on the type of
the application and on the examiner's eort, which is unobservable. If the application is good
(G), the examiner never obtains any signal ( = ?). If the application is bad (B), he obtains
a signal  = B with probability e, and no signal with probability 1 e, where e 2 [0;1] is the
eort that he puts into patent examination.
Assumption 1 (Soft information). Patent examination produces soft information: the signal
 = B is unveriable by the planner or third parties.
The examiner has utility
U = t + y   (e);
where t is the monetary transfer he receives from the planner, y is an intrinsic reward, and (e)
is the cost of eort (increasing and convex with (0) = 0(0) = 0 and 0(1) = 1). I assume
that the examiner is protected by limited liability (i.e., transfers must be non-negative). The
intrinsic reward y takes dierent values depending on the type of application and the approval
decision, as indicated in table 1.
Assumption 2 (Intrinsic motivation). Intrinsic rewards satisfy yG  0 and yB  0.
According to Assumption 2, the examiner derives an intrinsic reward from accepting good
applications and from rejecting bad ones.4 The expected intrinsic reward also depends on the
4 The fact that the top-right and lower-left elds are set to zero is a normalization. All that matters for






Table 1: Intrinsic rewards
examiner's posterior belief that an application is valid given the result of his prior-art search.
This reward structure formalizes the idea that the examiner cares about making the right
decision.
Several interpretations are possible. One is that some information about the quality
of an examiner's decisions may transpire over time. Although this information cannot be
contracted on, it can be used in subjective performance evaluation and thus be brought
to bear on promotion and dismissal decisions which are part of the organization's implicit
incentives. The information may also be learnt by the examiner's peers, whose esteem he may
value. Alternatively, the examiner may have genuine intrinsic motivation, i.e. he may care
about the consequences of his decisions on others (in this context, particularly consumers and
technology users).5
Applicants
Potential applicants' ling strategies depend on how much eort they expect the examiner
to provide. For now, I will adopt a reduced-form approach that consists in making assumptions
about their best-response function p(e), i.e. the function relating the proportion of good
applications to the examiner's eort. In section 4 below, I endogenize applicants' best response
by explicitly modeling their ling strategies.
Assumption 3 (Applicants' best response). Applicants' best-response function p(e) is con-
tinuously dierentiable and satises the following properties: 0 < p(e)  1 for all e, p(0) < 1,
and p0 > 0.
In words, the proportion of good applicants is always strictly larger than 0 and weakly
smaller than 1. When eort is zero, the proportion of bad applications is strictly positive.
The proportion of good applications increases with eort.
Timing
The timing of the game is as follows (see gure 1). At the beginning of the game, the planner
5 While the economic literature has only recently begun to acknowledge the importance of intrinsic moti-
vation for understanding bureaucracies (see, e.g., Prendergast (2007)), in the public administration literature
the concept of \public-service motivation" has a long tradition, and its relevance is empirically established









Signal  2 fB;?g realized.
Acceptance/rejection.
Payos realized.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
Figure 1: Timing of the examination game
sets an application fee and chooses an incentive scheme for the examiner.6 Then, rms le for
patents. The examiner decides how much examination eort e to provide. Finally, signals are
drawn, acceptance and rejection decisions are made, and payos are realized. The important
assumption here is that the examiner cannot commit to a level of examination eort e before
rms decide on their ling behavior. This implies that the examiner does not take into account
the eect of his eort on the proportion of good and bad applications.
Discussion of assumptions
The setup we have adopted, with the signal being modeled as soft information and the
examiner caring about making correct decisions, calls for some justication. Soft information
is generally considered a reasonable description of situations involving complex scientic evi-
dence (see, e.g., Shin, 1998). Patent applications are inherently technical and have increased
in complexity over time. Moreover, patentability criteria, and the non-obviousness standard
in particular, are often vague, somewhat ill-dened concepts. As noted by Jae and Lerner
(2004, p. 172), \there is an essentially irreducible aspect of judgment in determining if an
invention is truly new. After all, even young Albert Einstein faced challenges while assess-
ing applications (...) in the Swiss Patent Oce." In an experiment carried out by the UK
Patent Oce in 2005, workshop participants were asked to evaluate whether a number of
ctitious inventions satised dierent denitions of a \technical contribution" (Friebel et al.,
2006).7 There was large disagreement among participants as to the conformity of the cti-
tious applications with any given denition. Because of ambiguity in patentability criteria
and the technical complexity of applications, patent examiners are likely to have considerable
discretion over the decision to grant or reject an application.
Moreover, little information about the quality of their decisions is available in the short
run. While judicial and administrative review of patent validity, such as court hearings, re-
examination (in the U.S.) or opposition (in Europe), provides such information, it occurs with
a signicant time lag. Another problem is that courts may dier in their \patent friendliness"
6 This is a restriction on the set of instruments that the planner has at her disposal. In particular, I impose
a uniform application fee instead of conditioning fees on the outcome of the examination.
7 The notion of \technical contribution" was part of a proposed EU directive dealing with software patents;
see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002 0092en01.pdf.
8across time and space.8 These considerations make it impractical to include information on
decision quality in a contract. It seems more appropriate to model it as being part of the
implicit incentives within the patent oce.9
3 Designing incentives for the examiner
In this section, I look at the design of incentives for the examiner taking the application fee as
given. I defer the specication of the social value of examination to section 4; for now I assume
simply that the examiner's intrinsic motivation alone leads to insucient eort provision from
the planner's point of view. The planner would thus like to increase eort above the \natural"
level. I also assume that there is no reason other than (possibly) incentives not to grant a
patent when no signal is found.10
The problem the planner faces is one of moral hazard followed by adverse selection: the
examiner's eort determines the distribution of \types" (in this case, the distribution of
signals). We can work backwards from the adverse-selection stage and invoke the revelation
principle, according to which a direct revelation mechanism is without loss of generality. The
planner oers a menu of contracts (t~ ;x~ ) where ~  2 fB;?g is the signal reported by the
examiner, t is the transfer he receives and x the probability that the patent is granted. That
is, the planner asks the examiner to report his signal . If he reports B, the planner pays
tB and grants a patent with probability xB. If he reports ?, the planner pays t? and grants
with probability x?.
Consider the case where the examiner has exerted equilibrium eort e > 0 and come up
with signal  = B. For him to prefer to report B, it must be the case that
tB + (1   xB)yB  t? + (1   x?)yB: (1)
Given signal B, he knows with certainty that the application is bad, but he only enjoys the
intrinsic reward from rejection with probability (1 x~ ). If, on the other hand, the examiner
obtains no signal ( = ?), he will prefer to report ? provided
tB + ^ pxByG + (1   ^ p)(1   xB)yB  t? + ^ px?yG + (1   ^ p)(1   x?)yB; (2)
8 Observers have suggested that this was the case in the United States after the creation of a centralized
appeals court for patent disputes, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).
9 It seems inappropriate to treat this as a standard career-concerns setup. The main outside opportunity for
patent examiners is employment in law rms. But the value of former patent examiners for patent attorneys
comes mainly from their inside knowledge of the patent oce, rather than from the particular skills they
demonstrated during their stay at the oce. As a matter of fact, examiners often leave before any information
about the quality of their decisions becomes available to the public. The signaling motive emphasized by
career-concerns models seems to be largely irrelevant.
10 I discuss this assumption in footnote 15 below.
9where ^ p  Pr[Gj?] is the examiner's posterior belief that the application is valid given that
he has found no evidence to the contrary. His expected intrinsic reward from reporting B is
^ pxByG + (1   ^ p)(1   xB)yB, while that from reporting ? is ^ px?yG + (1   ^ p)(1   x?)yB.
Turning to the moral-hazard stage, suppose the examiner anticipates truthfully revealing
the signal he nds. He then chooses e to maximize
p[t? + x?yG] + (1   p)

e[tB + (1   xB)yB] + (1   e)[t? + (1   x?)yB]

  (e):
With probability p, the application is good, so that he cannot nd any grounds for rejection.
The transfer he receives is t?, and the expected intrinsic reward is x?yG. With probability
1   p, the application is bad, for which he nds evidence with probability e. He is paid tB
and enjoys an expected intrinsic reward of (1  xB)yB. With probability 1  e, the examiner
nds no evidence. He receives a transfer of t? and an expected intrinsic reward of (1 x?)yB.
Dierentiating with respect to e leads to the rst-order condition
(1   p)[tB   t?   (xB   x?)yB] = 0(e): (3)
It follows from (3) that eort is increasing in tB   t? and decreasing in xB   x?. Moreover,
a strictly positive level of examination eort is only sustainable if the examiner expects there
to be some bad applications (p < 1).
A nal set of constraints comes from the possibility of double deviation: the examiner
may deviate from both the equilibrium eort and truthful reporting. Two cases are relevant:
always reporting B, and always reporting ?.11 In both cases, choosing e = 0 is optimal (if
the examiner anticipates that his report will not depend on his signal, there is no point in
exerting eort). To rule out double deviation, the equilibrium utility with truthful reporting
must be larger than the utility with zero eort and either report (B or ?). Letting U denote
the examiner's equilibrium utility, we must have
tB + pxByG + (1   p)(1   xB)yB  U (4)
and
t? + px?yG + (1   p)(1   x?)yB  U; (5)
with
U = p[t? + x?yG] + (1   p)

e[tB + (1   xB)yB] + (1   e)[t? + (1   x?)yB]

  (e): (6)
Given the absence of a shadow cost of public funds, transfers are not costly to the planner
(they are pure redistribution). Moreover, as I show in the proof of Lemma 1 below, there
11 A third strategy, which would consist in always reporting the opposite of the signal found, leads to an
optimal eort of zero and therefore reduces to the strategy of always reporting B.
10is no conict between welfare and eort maximization in the choice of grant probabilities.
Therefore, the planner's objective is simply to maximize the examiner's eort. Since incentives
for eort provision are increasing in the left-hand side of (3), the planner's problem is
max
(tB;xB);(t?;x?)
tB   t?   (xB   x?)yB;
subject to (1), (2), (4), (5), t  0, 0  x  1, and e  eo, where eo denotes the level of
eort the planner would choose if he could control it directly. Ignoring the last constraint,
we have:
Lemma 1 (Incentive design). In designing the examiner's incentives, the planner optimally
chooses deterministic grant probabilities: x? = 1 and xB = 0. The optimal transfers satisfy
tB   t? = ^ pyG   (1   ^ p)yB  
(e)
p + (1   p)(1   e)
: (7)
Proof: Since incentives for eort provision increase with tB t?, it is the upward constraints,
(2) and (4), that are relevant. Rewriting them respectively as
tB   t?  (x?   xB)[^ pyG   (1   ^ p)yB] (8)
(tB   t?)[p + (1   p)(1   e)]  (x?   xB)[pyG   (1   p)(1   e)yB]   (e) (9)
and using ^ p = p=[p + (1   p)(1   e)] so that (9) becomes
tB   t?  (x?   xB)[^ pyG   (1   ^ p)yB]  
(e)
p + (1   p)(1   e)
; (10)
we see that (10) implies (8). Thus, (10) is the binding constraint, which we can use to replace
tB   t? in the objective. We obtain
(x?   xB)^ p[yG + yB   (e)=p]: (11)
Notice that any incentive-compatible contract will feature x?  xB; otherwise (1) and (2)
cannot be simultaneously satised. Thus, if there is to be a positive level of eort, the
expression in parentheses must be positive. It follows that (11) is increasing in x?   xB, so
incentives are maximized for x? = 1 and xB = 0. Substituting these values in (10) yields the
claimed result. 
Lemma 1 shows that, in terms of incentives, applications should always be rejected when
defeating prior art is found, and granted when none is found. The intuition is that, even
though reducing x? or increasing xB can relax the incentive-compatibility constraints (by















Figure 2: Equilibrium of the examination game
eect dominates, making it optimal to use deterministic grant probabilities. The dierence
in transfers, tB   t?, is chosen at the highest level compatible with the double-deviation
constraint (4).12
Incentive compatibility severely limits the use of monetary transfers by imposing an upper
bound on the power of incentives, as equation (7) shows. The intuition is that soft information
gives the examiner discretion over the grant decision. If we pay him a lot for rejecting, he will
reject too many applications (in this simple model, all of them in fact). If we pay him a lot
for accepting, he will accept too many of them. If he is to exert any eort, he must anticipate
truthfully revealing the signal he nds. Monetary incentives can only induce additional eort
to the extent that they do not jeopardize truthful revelation.
Having derived the optimal incentive scheme, we can compute the examiner's best-response
function e(p), i.e., the function that relates his eort to the proportion of good applications.
Plugging the values from Lemma 1 into (3), e(p) is obtained as the solution to
(1   p)
p[yG + yB]   (e)
p + (1   p)(1   e)
= 0(e): (12)
Combining applicants' and the examiner's best responses yields the equilibrium of the exam-
ination game.
Lemma 2 (Existence of equilibrium). An equilibrium (p;e) of the examination game exists
12 Note that the lemma does not specify the level of transfers, but only the dierence. The level will be
chosen so as to satisfy the examiner's participation constraint, which I have not made explicit because public
funds are assumed to be costless.
12and is characterized by
p = p(e)
0(e) = (1   p)
p[yG + yB]   (e)
p + (1   p)(1   e)
:
Proof: Each player's strategy set is the unit interval, [0;1], which is a nonempty, convex
and compact subset of R. The examiner's payo function is continuous in (e;p) and concave
in e (because 00 > 0). The rms' best-response function is continuous by Assumption 3.
By the existence theorem for Nash equilibria in innite games with continuous payos (see,
e.g., Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)), equilibrium exists. It is obtained at the
intersection of the players' best-response correspondences. 
The equilibrium is depicted in gure 2. The inverted-U shape of the e(p) function has
an intuitive explanation. If p = 0 or p = 1, the examiner knows in advance whether he is
facing a good or bad application. There is no point in exerting eort to acquire information
that is redundant. Lemma 2 shows existence of equilibrium. The assumptions made do not
guarantee uniqueness, however. What is important for the remainder of the analysis is that
in the case of multiple equilibria the equilibrium is picked according to a deterministic rule
rather than randomly.
The restrictions on transfers caused by soft information (see Lemma 1) mean that extrinsic
rewards can only play a limited role in providing incentives. This gives a crucial role to
intrinsic motivation. In the following proposition, I introduce a constant , by which I
multiply both types of intrinsic reward, yG and yB;  can be interpreted as a measure of the
overall strength of intrinsic motivation, keeping the ratio between yG and yB xed. It allows
us to analyze how intrinsic motivation aects the equilibrium outcome, all other things being
equal. The idea is that the relative strength of yG and yB is largely determined exogenously, for
example by applicants' and challengers' propensities to appeal the examiner's decisions. The
absolute strength of intrinsic motivation is likely to be more malleable to policy intervention.
Proposition 1 (Importance of intrinsic motivation). Let   0 be a constant multiplying yG
and yB. If  = 0, no eort can be sustained in equilibrium. An increase in  leads to an
equilibrium with greater eort and a larger proportion of good applicants.
Proof: The rst part of the proposition is immediate from looking at equation (12), deter-
mining e(p); if  = 0, then e(p) = 0 for all p. For the second part, it suces to show that
de(p)=d  0 because, by Assumption 3, p0 > 0. Rewrite (12) as




























Figure 3: Eect of an exogenous increase in intrinsic motivation
By the implicit function theorem, de(p)=d has the sign of the derivative of the right-hand
side with respect to e. Computation yields
@
@e
[0(e)[p + (1   p)(1   e)] + (1   p)(e)] = 00(e)[p + (1   p)(1   e)]  0;
where the inequality follows from the convexity of . 
Some amount of intrinsic motivation is essential for eort provision. If  = 0, the examiner
responds to any p with zero eort. Proposition 1 is illustrated in gure 3, which depicts the
eect of an exogenous increase in intrinsic motivation from  > 0 to 0 > . An examiner
who cares more about making the right decision exerts more eort, whatever the proportion
of good and bad applications. The e(p) function shifts out, and the equilibrium moves to the
north-east, along the p(e) curve.
The second main result of the equilibrium analysis concerns the compensation scheme,
and is the subject of Proposition 2. The constant  again measures the strength of intrinsic
motivation.
Proposition 2 (Examiner compensation). Suppose p(0) < yB=(yB + yG) and suppose that
there is ~ e < 1 such that p(~ e) = 1 and (~ e) < yG. Then, there exists a threshold ^  2 (0;1),
such that tB < t? for 0 <  < ^  and tB > t? for  > ^ .
Proof: Suppose  = 0. By Proposition 1, we then have e = 0 and p = p(0). From Lemma





























= p(0)yG   (1   p(0))yB < 0:
It follows that for small values of , tB   t? is negative. As  increases, so do e and p, by
Proposition 1. Eventually, e ! ~ e and, by the denition of ~ e, p ! 1, also implying ^ p = 1.
Thus, tB  t? ! yG  (~ e), which is positive by assumption. It follows that there must exist
a threshold ^  as dened in the proposition. 
Proposition 2 says that if intrinsic motivation is low (and under some conditions on p(e)),
the compensation scheme rewards the examiner for granting. Such a reward is needed to
ensure truthful revelation: were he not compensated for granting by means of a monetary
transfer, the examiner would reject all applications. The intuition is that in an equilibrium
where the proportion of bad applications is large and eort low, the best the examiner can
do to avoid mistakes is reject everything. Of course, anticipating this, he will not exert any
eort either. Thus, the reward for granting actually induces positive, albeit low, eort.
As intrinsic motivation increases, it eventually becomes possible to reward the examiner
for rejecting applications without impeding truthful revelation. Rewarding rejection has a
positive feedback eect on eort. The model thus yields a complementarity between intrinsic
and extrinsic rewards: higher intrinsic motivation allows the planner to use monetary incen-
tives more eectively. Intuitively, as the equilibrium values of p and e increase, the conict
between truthful revelation and eort provision is attenuated.
4 Endogenizing applicant behavior
4.1 Modeling rms' choice of activity
In this section, I endogenize the applicants' best-response function p(e). This allows me to
derive some further results relating to the planner's choice of the application fee . Suppose
there is a continuum (with mass 1) of potential applicant rms. Firms are characterized by
a creativity parameter , which is their private knowledge and distributed according to cdf
F() on [0;1).








Firms are endowed with one indivisible unit of time which they can devote either to R&D
or to ling a bogus patent application claiming something that is either obvious or not novel.
15Alternatively, rms can stay idle. The idea is that there are existing technologies or obvious
combinations of existing technologies that (a) rms can claim to have invented and which are
not easily distinguishable from true inventions, and that (b), if awarded a patent, allow the
patent holder to extract rents from users; a necessary condition is that such bad patents are
enforced by the courts with positive probability. Denote a rm's decision by d() 2 fR;B;Ig.
If it does R&D (d() = R), its payo when awarded a patent is R().13 If it submits a bogus
application (d() = B) and obtains a patent, its payo is B() (which can be thought of as
the expected prot taking into account the possibility that the patent may be invalidated by
the courts later on). I assume that rms' prot is zero or negative if they fail to obtain a
patent. Their payo when staying idle (d() = I) is zero.
Given an application fee  and an anticipated examination eort e, each type of rm
chooses d() to maximize its expected payo. Suppose for simplicity that research always
leads to patentable inventions. Research then yields a net prot of R()   , while a bogus
applicant can expect net prot (1  e)B() .14 Thus, a rm prefers R&D to imposture if
and only if
R()  (1   e)B():




(ii) R(0) < B(0) and B(0)  0,
(iii) lim!1 R() = 1 or lim!1[R()   B()] > 0,
(iv) 00
R  0 and 00
B  00
R.
Prots from both activities increase with , perhaps because identifying valuable bogus
applications requires some of the same qualities as identifying valuable research projects.
Prots from research are more sensitive to creativity than those from bogus patents, though.
13 This can be seen as a reduced-form prot function resulting from a rm's investment choice; see footnote
14 below.
14 The assumption that genuine research always results in patentable inventions is not crucial. If instead
genuine inventors sometimes inadvertently re-invent old products or processes, their expected prot decreases
with e. But what matters for the decision between research and imposture is the relative attractiveness of
each of these activities. Increasing e still makes research relatively more attractive than imposture.
If R() is interpreted as a reduced-form prot function resulting from the rm's investment choice, another
question is whether examination eort and the application fee inuence the optimal R&D investment, which
would make the above analysis invalid. However, given the model setup, the level of investment, and thus
R, is independent of e and . To see this, assume (following Cornelli and Schankerman (1999)) that the
rm's prot (gross of application fees) is given by (z;)    (z), where z is its R&D investment and  (z)
the associated cost. Assuming z > 0  zz (subscripts denote partial derivatives), and  
0 > 0,  
00 > 0, the
optimal amount of R&D eort, z
(), is determined by z(z;) =  
0(z). Clearly, z
 is independent of e and
, and R() = (z










Figure 4: Self-selection of rms according to creativity 
For rms at the lower end of the creativity distribution ( = 0), obtaining a patent on a bogus
application is more protable than producing a true invention, while towards the upper end of
the distribution, it is the opposite. Finally, the rst derivatives of the prot functions satisfy
monotonicity conditions.
This single-crossing assumption is sucient for the existence of a unique threshold ^  such
that, in the absence of application fees, d() = B for all  < ^  and d() = R for all   ^ .
The threshold depends on the (expected) eort, i.e., ^  = h(e), where h is the implicit function
dened by
R(^ ) = (1   e)B(^ ): (13)
Moreover, provided   R(^ ), there is a second threshold  = `(e;) dened by
(1   e)B() = ; (14)
such that rms with creativity higher than ^  do research, rms with creativity between ^ 
and  submit bogus applications, and rms with creativity lower than  remain idle. Thus,
a patent policy (;e) leads to self-selection of rms between genuine R&D, imposture, and
inactivity, as illustrated in gure 4.
To close the model, I specify the eects of innovations and bad patents on social welfare.
Innovations generate social welfare (prots plus consumer surplus) W()  () with W0  0.
That is, the social value of innovation (weakly) exceeds the private value, and more creative
inventors produce more valuable innovations, both from a private and a social point of view.
Bad patents cause a social loss of L() > 0. I make no assumption on how this loss is related
to creativity.
174.2 Optimal policy when the planner directly controls examination
Let us derive the patent policy that the planner would choose ex ante if she could directly
control both application fee and eort.15 The optimal combination of  and e maximizes
Z 1
^ 
W()dF()   (1   e)
Z ^ 

L()dF()   (e)[1   F()] (15)
subject to (13), (14) and   ^ . The rst term corresponds to the social value created
by research (undertaken by rms whose creativity exceeds ^ ), the second term captures the
expected social losses from bad patents, and the third term represents the cost of examination.
The constraint   ^  reects the fact that setting e and  such that ^  is strictly below  can
never be optimal. Holding  constant, one could reduce e (and save the associated costs)
without changing the set of rms who obtain patents. The following proposition characterizes
the optimal patent policy.
Proposition 3 (Optimal policy). Suppose Assumptions 4 and 5 hold. The optimal policy
(eo;o) involves full deterrence of bad applications:  = ^ . Examination eort eo satises the
following equation:
  h0(eo)W(^ )f(^ ) = 0(eo)[1   F(^ )]   h0(eo)(eo)f(^ ): (16)
The application fee is given by o = R(h(eo)).
Proof: Let us rst show that the constraint   ^  must be binding. Let  be the multiplier




f()[(1   e)L() + (e)]   

= 0: (17)
Since @`=@ > 0,  > 0, so indeed  = ^ . This implies  = R(h(e)). We obtain (16) by
dierentiating (15) with respect to e, substituting for  from (17) and using the fact that
 = ^ . It remains to be shown that the second-order condition holds at eo, which requires




At eo, this can be rewritten using the fact that, by (16),  = 0(1   F)=(h0f) + W:
 (h0)2W0f + (1   F)

h00
h0 0   00

+ h002f2 + (1   F)f0
f
< 0:
15 I restrict attention to deterministic grant probabilities, i.e. xB = 0 and x? = 1. While xB = 0 is
clearly optimal, x? = 1 may not be: by not always issuing a patent when no signal is found, the planner
avoids deadweight loss. Because I have not explicitly modeled R&D investment, however, I cannot make a
meaningful statement on the optimal x? within this model. I therefore assume that x? is constrained to be 1
by law.
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B
3 > 0
where the inequalities follow from Assumption 5. 
Greater examination eort increases the attractiveness of genuine research relative to
imposture. That is, e determines the incentives to do R&D. The planner chooses eo to
equalize the marginal social gains from more innovation (the left-hand side of (16)) with the
marginal cost of examination (the right-hand side of (16)). Meanwhile, o is set so as to deter
all rms with  < ^  = h(eo) from applying. At the optimum, there are no bogus applications,
and no bad patent is issued. Intuitively, as long as  < R(^ ), raising the application fee
does not represent a disincentive to innovation in this model: only those types of rm who
would anyway nd it optimal to submit bogus applications are discouraged from applying for
patents. Thus, there is no loss in raising the fee up to the level where imposture is completely
deterred.
4.3 Choice of application fee with delegated examination
The previous section analyzed the benchmark case where the planner directly controls e. I
now return to the case where examination is delegated to an examiner and investigate the
planner's choice of application fee when she cannot control e directly but only indirectly
through the examiner's incentive scheme. I start by showing that the best-response function
generated by the model of applicant behavior in section 4.1 satises Assumption 3, so the
results from section 3 continue to apply. I then investigate the eect of the application fee 
on the applicants' best response and draw some conclusions for the planner's choice of .





I for  < `(e;)
B for `(e;)   < h(e)
R for   h(e):
Since activity R always results in patentable inventions, and thus good applications, while
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Figure 5: Eect of a change in the application fee





Since F, h and ` are continuously dierentiable functions, so is p. It is bounded below by
p(0) =
1 G(h(0))
1 G(`(0;)) > 0 (by property (iii) of Assumption 5) and bounded above by 1. For a
given , the upper bound is reached at ~ e, dened by h(~ e) = `(~ e;). Since dh=de < 0 and
@`=@e > 0, we have p0(e) > 0. Thus, the model of endogenous applicant behavior satises
Assumption 3.
How does the application fee aect the applicants' best response? Since @`=@ > 0, we
have @p(e)=@  0 for all e. Thus, the proportion of good applications is increasing in the
application fee, as depicted in gure 5.
Let us consider the comparative statics of a change in the application fee. As  increases,
the p(e) curve shifts upwards. The eects on equilibrium depend on whether one is in the
upward or downward sloping part of the e(p) curve. In the upward-sloping part (p small),
raising  leads to increases in both p and e. In the downward-sloping part (p large), raising
 leads to an increase in p and a decrease in e.
It follows that it can never be optimal for the planner to choose  such that the equilib-
rium is in the upward-sloping part of the e(p) curve; increasing  up to the level where the
equilibrium is at the peak of the e(p) curve is unambiguously welfare enhancing. Beyond this
point, however, the planner faces a tradeo : on the one hand, a higher application fee entails
fewer bad applications. On the other hand, the resulting decrease in equilibrium eort reduces
the level of innovation. Bad patents are inevitable unless the planner sets the fee so high that
even in the absence of any examination eort, only true inventors apply for patents. The
20planner has to choose the lesser of two evils: a situation where no examination takes place
(e = 0) and bogus applications are deterred through prohibitively large application fees, or a
situation with more research but at the expense of some impostors submitting applications
and a fraction of them obtaining patent protection on their alleged inventions.
5 Conclusion
I have presented a three-tier hierarchy model of patent examination. A benevolent planner
(the principal) delegates patent examination to an examiner (the supervisor) who receives
applications led by rms (the agents). The planner chooses an application fee for rms
and an incentive scheme for the examiner. An application can be good or bad, and the
examiner needs to exert eort to obtain a signal about it. I model examination as a moral-
hazard problem followed by an adverse-selection problem: the examiner must be induced to
provide eort but also to reveal the signal he nds, the assumption being that the signal is
soft information (unveriable by third parties, including the planner). I have also assumed
that the examiner has a desire to make the right decisions, which I have termed intrinsic
motivation. Finally, I have modeled the proportion of good applications as endogenous,
depending on the eort that rms expect the examiner to provide.
I have shown that soft information severely constrains the design of incentives, so that in-
trinsic motivation becomes a crucial determinant of the equilibrium outcome. When intrinsic
motivation is low, the equilibrium features low eort and a large proportion of bad applica-
tions. In such an equilibrium, monetary incentives may be reduced to the role of ensuring
truthful revelation, leading to a seemingly paradoxical compensation scheme that rewards
examiners for granting. Yet this scheme succeeds in inducing the examiner to provide eort:
if the examiner anticipated not being truthful, he would optimally choose zero eort. The
model also generates a complementarity between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. As intrinsic
motivation increases, extrinsic (monetary) incentives can be used more eectively.
I have argued that the modeling assumptions I use (most notably soft information and
intrinsic motivation) provide a reasonable description of how patent examination works in
practice. Examining patents requires assessing complex scientic evidence. Moreover, there
is little short-term information about the quality of the examiner's decisions; such information
only becomes available after a delay and is dicult to contract on. It may, however, be used
in the organization's promotion and dismissal decisions, which provide long-term implicit
incentives. These implicit incentives tend to create a desire to make correct decisions on the
examiner's part, consistent with how I have dened intrinsic motivation.
If the examiner cares about correct decisions because they aect his future with the patent
21oce, a case can be made that how much he cares depends on how long he expects to stay at
the patent oce. He is likely to care more if he expects to stay long-term because, in the long
run, more information about the quality of his decision-making becomes available. He can
be rewarded for good decisions through promotion and punished for poor decisions through
dismissal. For the same reason, intrinsic motivation is also likely to depend on the precise
meaning of \long run." That is, how timely does information about the examiner's decisions
become available?
On both of those dimensions, the U.S. and European patent oces dier considerably.
At the EPO, examiners usually stay for their entire career. At the USPTO, the average
examiner stays for only three years, making long-term incentives largely irrelevant. The
EPO also has the edge in terms of timely information about decision quality, thanks to its
widely-used opposition system. Opposition allows private parties to mount a challenge against
questionable patents through the patent oce itself. The opposition procedure produces
much faster results than judicial review through the court system. Although the USPTO has
a similar procedure called re-examination, it is rarely used (Graham et al., 2002).
In the light of these considerations, which suggest that intrinsic motivation, as dened in
this paper, is higher at the EPO than at the USPTO, the model can explain why U.S. exam-
iners are essentially rewarded for granting patents, but also why European examiners do not
face a similar compensation scheme and instead receive a xed wage. In addition, its predic-
tions are consistent with the fact that the quality of patents issued is generally perceived to
be lower in the U.S. than in Europe.
The main policy implications concern examiner retention and administrative patent re-
view. A functioning system of administrative review makes information on the examiners'
decision quality available in a more timely manner. Examiners should be retained long enough
for long-term incentives to be eective. While this probably requires increasing their salary
to match their outside opportunity, the resulting improvement in the quality of examination
should reduce the number of bad applications led. This will partially oset the eect of
increasing salaries on costs.
The analysis suggests that retaining examiners and creating administrative review are
important for reasons beyond those typically mentioned in the patent-reform debate, which
has focused on the fact that more experienced examiners perform better work and that private
parties may be better informed about prior art than examiners. Rather, the argument here
is that both measures improve examiners' incentives to make correct decisions and allow for
more eective reinforcement of eort provision through short-term compensation.
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